That the Doha Round was never really meant to be has something to do with why talks are failing now. Doha was not in the original playbook, but was largely inspired by September 11. Shortly after, the then trade representative Bob Zoellick argued that U.S. national security was intimately intertwined with open borders to trade with underdeveloped economies. In his words:
Trade is about more than economic efficiency. It promotes the values at the
heart of this protracted struggle...Erecting new barriers and closing old borders will not help the impoverished. It will not feed hundreds of millions struggling for subsistence. It will not liberate the persecuted...And it certainly will not placate terrorists. This President and this Administration will fight for open markets and free trade. We will not be intimidated by those who have taken to the streets to blame trade -- and America -- for the world's ills. The global trading system has demonstrated -- from Seoul to Santiago -- that it is a pathway out of poverty and despair.
This concept-that poverty leads to ill-will and then terrorism, and that trade reduces poverty-was manifest in Bush's Middle East Free Trade Area Initiative and then in subsequent deals with countries including Jordan, Oman, and Morocco, that brought narrow economic benefits to the U.S. but were intended to foster longer term economic relationships and shorter term political benefits. In retrospect, it's probably not surprising that a round based on geopolitical objectives, and not by the business interests necessary to make difficult concessions worthwhile in the eyes of politicians and negotiators, would start on shaky ground and not get far off of it.
There are many other reasons why Doha has failed. Among them, the issues have become more complex. The previous round (Uruguay) witnessed the introduction of intellectual property into the talks, signaling that the relative importance of lowering tariffs and other barriers to trade had deminished. In order for talks to be worthwhile-it was implied-formerly second tier issues such as IPR would need to be brought to the table. Further, the table itself was full of new, if not stronger, personalities than before. Multilateral trade wasn't so difficult in the late 1940s, when negotiating partners shared political and strategic objectives. But by the time the Doha talks got started, the players were not only greater in number but had diverse political orientations. China, India, and Russia would now play a prominent role in global trade talks. Despite U.S. rhetoric, the talks would not be based on political objectives, but on cold-hearted economics. Even if they were based on political objectives, all of the parties involved may not have shared them. Finally, it has been argued by Bhagwati and other proponents of multilateral trade that the proliferation of bilateral deals has stunted the progression of multilateral talks. Why waste time on a grand bargain that may or may not go through and will be watered down at best when the quick, meaningful bilateral deals can be negotiated in the meantime? There are other reasons for Doha's death, but in sum:
Talks have reached a point of diminishing returns which is easily seen by the introduction of new issues such as IPR. Alternatives such as bilateral and regional agreements add to this effect. The parties at the table are also more diverse and unwilling to make concessions based on political or security considerations as was the case when the GATT (now WTO) was founded. Finally, envirnmental and labor standards aren't helping, and neither are statements from Zarkozy.
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